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LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
EDWARD M. LIVINGSTON*
RICHARD D. NEWMAN
CHILE WITHDRAWS FROM ANDEAN PACT
A recurrent crisis which has plagued the Andean Common Market
(ANCOM) for the past year (8 Law.Atn. 832, 1976) resulted in the with-
drawal of Chile from the Andean Pact. The withdrawal, announced on
October 31, 1976, followed several days of unsuccessful negotiations aimed
at resolving fundamental differences in the treatment of foreign trade and
investment within the region. Despite apprehensions that the Chilean
withdrawal would prompt the stagnation of the Pact, there is speculation
that the withdrawal of the Pact's most dissident member may result in a
return to the political stability which had been the hallmark of ANCOM
progress since the date of its inception.
The present dispute is the logical outcome of the dramatic political
upheavals which have occurred in Chile since the overthrow of the social-
ist-Marxist regime in 1973. During the early stages of the Pact (1969-
1973), the Chilean government vigorously advocated ANCOM programs
designed to promote regional and national autonomy over foreig-owned
businesses and investments. Thus, in 1970, Chile was instrumental in in-
fluencing the Cartagena Commission to enact the Andean Code on Foreign
Investment (Decision 24). The Code established a regional regulatory
system for the treatment of foreign capital, trademarks, patents, licenses,
and royalties. (5 Law.Am. 259, 1973; 8 Law.Arn. 635, 1976). The salient
provisions of Decision 24 require that each member government "rena-
tionalize" its economy by: (1) acquiring a 51% interest in all foreign
investments by 1985; and (2) limiting profit remittances abroad by for-
eign companies to an amount not exceeding 14% of total net profits per
year. The terms of Decision 24 were incorporated into Chilean legislation
in Decree 482 of 1972.
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The present Chilean government, however, has deempbasized na-
tionalism or regionalism while placing a high priority upon the attraction
of foreign investment through the elimination of trade barriers. Chilean
representatives in ANCOM have criticized as wasteful the provisions for
mandatory expenditures of local capital for the acquisition of foreign
investments. They claimed that this capital would be more efficiently util-
ized if allocated for investment in local job-creating ventures. In 1974,
Chile enacted legislation which substantially nullified the impact of De-
cision 24 within the country. Decree Law 600 of 1974 grants broad con-
cessions to foreign investors, including the right in some instances to
reacquire state-owned properties and the right to remit profits abroad
without regard to the 14% limitation.
A further source of controversy involved the level of the common
external tariff. While Chile favored a low tariff (ranging from 10 to
35%), the other members wanted a tariff four to five times higher as a
means of protecting local industry against competition from foreign im-
ports. As in the case of Decision 24, Chile adopted legislation which
openly contravened the spirit and intent of ANCOM tariff policy. For
example, Article 17 of Decree Law 600 provided for duty-free entry of
capital goods to be used in the development of business or investments in
which the foreign ownership interest exceeds 20%. The apparent objec-
tive was to encourage foreign control of business ventures and other
investments within the country.
The refusal of the other ANCOM members to agree to Chilean pro-
posals to renegotiate the terms of Decision 24 and the common external
tariff were the focal points of the recent dispute and the main factors
contributing to the Chilean withdrawal. In addition, ANCOM members
opposed Chile's insistence that the proposed extensions to the sectorial
program deadlines (Decision 100) not be implemented until an accord
was reached on the foreign investment regulations. The position of the
majority of the ANCOM members was summarized by the Peruvian For-
eign Minister earlier this year as follows: " . . . either we adopt inde-
pendent development models leading to the total liberation of our peoples,
or we consolidate a situation of domination and dependency perpetuating
our condition as underdeveloped countries."
The consensus among ANCOM officials is that the Chilean with-
drawal will not have a substantial adverse impact upon the integration
process. In 1975 Chile imported $197 million from ANCOM sources pur-
suant to the tariff cutting program and exported $115 million. These fig-
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ures represented only 10% of the country's total trade and a very small
percentage of total ANCOM trade. Moreover, two of Chile's major exports
to ANCOM members - newsprint and pulp - would have been lost in
any event under the sectorial development program.
According to Mr. Robert Taylor, Financial Economist for Latin
America in the U.S. Department of State, it is likely that the Chilean
withdrawal will cause delays in the sectorial development programs due
to the need to reallocate industries to other nations. However, since these
programs were extremely ambitious and insofar as most industries have
yet to commence operations, Chile's action comes before any substantial
damage to the programs can result.
It appears that any economic loss caused by the withdrawal of Chile
may be offset by the existence of greater political cohesion within the
Pact.
CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY
New Origin Rules and Process List Could Allect Trade
The Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM) recently agreed to the
introduction of new origin requirements for goods manufactured in the
region to replace the value-added system which has been in existence
since 1968. The new system went into effect for the four more-developed
countries (The "Big Four": Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad-
Tobago) on January 1, 1977.
The CARICOM treaty specifies three criteria for determining regional
origin status: (1) 100% manufacture in the region; (2) local-value added
to regionally made products that use less than 50% foreign inputs; and
(3) manufacture in the region using processes to be specified in a process
list. Manufactured goods meeting any of these criteria can qualify for
duty-free CARICOM access.
The implementation of the new origin system by the eight lesser
developed countries (LDCs) is to be considered at a meeting of the Com-
mon Market Council of Ministers in January, 1977. Until that time, the
local value-added criterion will give regional status to products manu-
factured in LDCs which use less than 60% foreign inputs rather than
the 50% requirement applicable to the "Big Four."
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The local value-added criterion is a compromise. The Process List
was to replace this criterion for all member countries because of the
difficulty under the old system in determining whether a finished product
originated in CARICOM. Under the old system, imported raw materials
and semi-manufactured components were regarded as having originated
in CARICOM. The LDCs argued that eliminating the value-added criterion
in favor of the Process List method would result in diminished trade op-
portunities, since the LDCs produced more goods from such imported raw
materials.
Consequently, the "Big Four" introduced the new Process List
method as the only rules-of-origin criterion for trade among themselves.
The Process List itself has remained confidential. However, in operation,
the system will accord area origin treatment to a finished item produced
from imported materials and components only if the manufacturing or
processing operation results in a change in tariff classification between
the imported starting inputs and the finished product. In addition, the
new Process List will specify certain manufacturing or processing opera-
tions which must be done locally.
Although the two-tiered system is Viewed by the CARICOM min-
isters as only a temporary arrangement, the delay in full adoption of the
Process List by CARICOM could create compliance problems for import-
ing countries thereby leading to a reduction in intra-regional trade.
Caribbean Food Corporation Agreement
The Caribbean Food Corporation is the mechanism which will be
used to implement the Regional Food Plan adopted by the Conference
of Heads of Government held in December, 1975. The purpose of the
Food Corporation is to achieve greater regional self-sufficiency in food
production through investment in activities related to the purchase, proc-
essing, transportation, marketing and distribution of food. Guyana be-
came the first member to sign the agreement in August of 1976 with
other CARICOM countries following suit in September. The implementa-
tion of the Regional Food Plan through this agreement, together with the
amount of authorized capital shares of the Corporation, $100 million,
indicates that the Caribbean countries are well on their way in attempting
to integrate food production.
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IMPROVED OUTLOOK FOR LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIES
The economy of Latin America appears to be regaining the rate of
growth it experienced prior to 1974. By 1970 Latin America had attained
a sustained rate of economic growth of about 7%. However, in 1975 Latin
America suffered its worst recession since World War II as reflected by
a growth rate of only 3% compared to 7.2% in 1974.
The rate for 1976 is expected to be between 3% and 4%, due to the
belated impact of world economic recovery on Latin America. The full
impact should be reflected in 1977, although improved economic growth
will continue to be accompanied by a high rate of inflation caused by the
heavy external borrowing of the oil-importing countries of Latin America
during the 1974-75 recession. Nevertheless, favorable conditions in many
sectors of the economy point to improved prospects for future growth.
In the area of industrial production, Latin America began a strong
recovery in late 1975 which should continue through 1977, albeit tem-
pered by the difficulty several countries are having in financing the
necessary level of imports to support current production growth. Although
the rate of growth of the petroleum industry has lagged behind that of
other developing economies, greater external cooperation and world de-
mand should help return the industrial sector to its pre-1974 growth rate
of about 9%.
The agricultural sector has experienced slow growth in comparison
to the economy as a whole. The value added by agriculture to the do-
mestic economy improved in 1974 relative to other sectors, but these in-
creases were more a result of farm area expansion than of yield improve-
ments. However, a rapid shift in population growth from the rural farm-
ing areas to urban centers (89.4% between 1960 and 1975) has made the
improvement of farming techniques of paramount concern. Consequently,
concerted effort in this direction, similar to the regional food agreement
of the Caribbean nations, is essential to reduce the strains on the produc-
tion, processing, and marketing of food in Latin America.
Other economic indicators are certain to reflect the growth Latin
America should experience in 1977, although the disparity between the
net oil-exporting countries (Bolivia, Ecuador, Trinidad-Tobago, and Vene-
zuela) and the non oil-exporting countries will continue. Due to the con-
tinuing price increases for imports, the non-oil countries' trade gains
deteriorated drastically in 1974 and 1975 in contrast to the considerable
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gains made by the major oil exporters. The same disparity occurred in the
balance of payments and international reserves positions of the Latin
American countries. Nevertheless, the upward trend of prices for primary
commodity exports (particularly coffee) and the improved economies of
the world's industrial nations will certainly aid the economic recovery of
Latin America. However, greater economic cooperation between the oil
and non-oil exporting countries of Latin America is necessary to cure
the drastic disparity of economic growth which currently exists.
